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1        
What is a logical constant? In which terms should we characterize the meaning
of logical words like “and”, “or”, “implies”? An attractive answer is: in terms of
their inferential roles, i.e. in terms of the role they play in building inferences.
Logical words are first and foremost the basis for reasoning, so it seems reason-
able that their meaning should be at least determined by the way they can be
used in reasoning. Peculiarly, their meaning is fixed by a small class of special
inferences: the rules that deal with each of them. We shall label this thesis the
Inferential Role Thesis ().
The following implementation of () is put forward by Došen [1989]:
given a purely structural sequent system1, each connective  is introduced
through a specific double rule that translates a sequent with  as main con-
nective in a formula into purely structural sequents. These double rules pro-
vide local analyses of logical constants of an object language, by contextually
defining them in the metalanguage in which the deductive system is expressed.
Considering conjunction again, the following double rule would do:
∗An earlier version of this paper was presented at the student session of 2004. The
authors thank the referees of the student session and of theAustralasian Journal of Logic for their
very helpful comments. Special thanks to Mikael Cozic, Jacques Dubucs, Paul Egré, Alejandro
Perez Carballo and to the audience at the Philform seminar in the  for their stimulating
suggestions at various stages of this work.
1We give an example of such a calculus on page 36.
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Γ ` A Γ ` B (∧)
Γ ` A∧ B
From top to bottom, it says that the conjunction can link two formulas
derivable from the same multiset of sentences: the logical sequent obtained
at the bottom of the rule abbreviates the two structural sequents on top; and
bottom up, the rule analyses the meaning of ∧: it indicates the way to go
back to the structural metalanguage, once you have introduced the conjunction
symbol. In this sense, a criterion for logicality of expressions is given: a constant
is a logical constant if and only if it can be analysed in purely structural terms.
This way of seeing things leads to:
 1 Logical constants are characterized by double rules translating logical expres-
sions into structural expressions.
Does the double rule analysis constitute a normative criterion, that is, a
criterion that would ban pseudo logical constants, whose adjunction to a previ-
ously consistent deduction system S creates inconsistency? At first sight, one
might think that the double-line phrasing encapsulates some form of harmony
between upward and downward direction.2 Unfortunately, this is not true.
Prior gave rules for a fake logical connective, tonk, the addition of which to
a consistent deduction system resulted in inconsistency [1960].3 One can de-
vise blonk, a close relative to Prior’s tonk which is defined in terms of a double
rule:
Γ ` A Γ ′ ` B (blonk)
Γ, Γ ′ ` A blonk B
Indeed, applying the upward direction of the rule to the axiom A blonk
B ` A blonk B, and taking Γ = {A blonk B} and Γ ′ empty, one can derive
both sequents A blonk B ` A and ` B. The possibility to derive the second
one amounts of course to the inconsistency of the system.4 This shows that
2We take harmony in a non-technical sense which should nevertheless be reminiscent of
dummettian ideas in a natural deduction setting.
3Tonk sequent rules are
Γ ` A (tonk-R)
Γ ` A tonk B
B ` ∆ (tonk-L)
A tonk B ` ∆
Their notorious effect is to make A ` B derivable for any A and B (the proof is trivial). But if we
just pick out one of them as a double rule introducing the constant tonk, no inconsistency will
arise. To do the job and create an inconsistency in a double rule framework, we appeal to blonk.
The inconsistency created by blonk is due to the arbitrary splitting of contexts in the upward
direction. Technically, this amounts to artificially forcing the invertibility of a non invertible
rule.
4Cook stresses the significance of the fact that tonk being pathological depends on the back-
ground consequence relation being transitive, by exhibiting a nearly reasonable non-transitive
consequence relation to which tonk can be safely added [2005]. By contrast, the pathology of
blonk depends only on the consequence relation being reflexive. It is clear that in order to de-
rive inconsistency from some given rules, one has to rely on some properties of the consequence
relation. Reflexivity is perhaps the most modest we can think of.
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Došen’s strategy does not tackle successfully the normativity issue. Even if it
can block some fake connectives like tonk the rules of which are not given by a
double rule, Blonk will not be banned. For Došen, this does not conflict with
the idea of an analysis of logicality. Došen might argue there is indeed nothing
wrong with the blonk rule, just because an analysis of what logical constants
are does not have to provide a normative theory discriminating good logical
constants from bad ones. Of course, this falls short of explaining what is the
difference between blonk and the logical connectives we actually use.
On the other side of the picture, a very well-known solution to tonk-like
difficulties has been given by Nuel Belnap in his 1961 paper. Belnap formulates
a general criterion for the admissibility of new logical constants in a system of
syntactic rules. To put it roughly, Belnap’s restriction is to add only connectives
that preserve good properties of the deducibility relation `, i.e. connectives
such that adding them to a previously given system yields a conservative exten-
sion of that system. Hence, under the hypothesis that the original system is a
consistent one, tonk-like connectives are not admissible anymore.
Belnap’s criterion does not address the logicality issue, but might help.
Since we want to add a normative component to Došen’s analysis, we could
take conservativity to be just that component and say that double rules that
actually define a logical constant are those that yield conservative extensions.
Unfortunately, this is not fully satisfactory. Why not? One good thing with
Došen’s double-line idea is that it is expressed as a local property of the form
of rules, so it would be nicer to have also a local phrasing of the normativity
constraint. Compare the requirement of conservativity that simultaneoulsy ap-
plies to a rule introducing a new item and to a given background system of
rules, to a local normative criterion that would just apply to a rule.
There is more than that though: Belnap’s criterion only tells us that in
certain contexts, certain rules are not good rules. But first, it is not true that
in every contexts, logical rules have to be conservative. Dummett has shown
that this can also happen in some particular cases with perfectly well-behaved
rules.5 And second, pathological constants like tonk can on the other hand be
conservative in certain contexts. Though tonk will not be conservative over a
consistent system, if it is added to a system in which A ` B is already derivable
for anyA and B, it will be conservative. We are looking for a context-insensitive
criterion, unlike conservativity. Therefore, what we need to single out is a local
property of the double rules that rules like the one for conjunction have and
that the one for blonk do not have. In other words, we have to solve the
following problem:
5Dummett makes the point in a natural deduction setting [1991, page 288–290]. If L has a
disjunction with a restricted elimination rule, allowing no collateral assumptions in the subor-
dinate deductions of the minor premises, adding an unrestricted disjunction will result in an
extension L ′ which is not conservative over L.
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 1 Find a property P such that genuine logical constants are characterised by
double rules enjoying P.
2     
2.1    
To phrase this property, we will rely on the setting of Basic Logic () as in-
troduced by Sambin et alii [2000]: the interesting fact about  for us now is
that it uses a double rule analysis of logical constants in the setting of a sequent
calculus. Prima facie, sequent systems are not part of the double rule picture,
because sequent rules for a logical constant are left and right introduction rules.
The point is that it is possible to see left and right introduction rules as derived
from a double rule.
More precisely, () is a very elementary sequent system that is conceived as
the product of an interaction between an already given purely structural meta-
language L and a logical language L that is built up step-by-step. We start from
a structural sequent calculus S: its language is L, made of atomic formulae
A,B, . . ., multisets of formulae Γ, ∆, . . ., and one binary punctuation symbol,
the comma. A structure is defined as a finite multiset of formulas, each formula
separated by commas from the others. L? is the set of structures defined over
L-expressions. A derivability relation is defined over L?2 and is denoted as
usual by `. Two links are expressible in S: and, and yields. For example the
following derivation:
Γ , A ` B ∆ ` B
Γ , A, ∆ ` B
should be read:
(((Γ and A) yields B) and (∆ yields B)) yields ((Γ and A and ∆) yields B).
The rules of S are identity axioms, exchange rules, and a split form of cut,
right and left compositions. Right and left compositions (abbreviated as L
and R) are immediately derived from the meaning attached to the link
“yields”:
Γ ` A Γ ′ ` ∆ L
Γ ′(Γ /A) ` ∆
Γ ` ∆′ A ` ∆ R
Γ ` ∆′(∆/A)
The left composition rule allows one, provided that A ∈ Γ ′, to replace one oc-
currence of A by Γ in Γ ′. The right composition rule allows one, provided that
A ∈ ∆′ to replace one occurrence of A by ∆ in ∆′. To sum up the justification
of these half-cut rules, one can say that when A appears on the left of “yields”,
it can be replaced by the set of hypotheses used to deduce A (the formulas that
yield A), and when it appears on the right, it can be replaced by the set of its
conclusions (the formulas that are yielded by A).
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In , logical connectives are introduced according to a so-called reflection
principle: each of them must reflect a specific structural link. This require-
ment is close to Došen’s metaphor of logical constants as punctuation marks,
but the picture will be given a much more precise meaning. In the terms of
Sambin, introduction rules are the solution of a double rule construed as a
definitional equation for a logical constant.
Let’s see on an example how the solving process works. Take the following
definitional equation:
A,B ` Γ (⊗)
A⊗ B ` Γ
We first notice that the context aside the introduced formula is empty: this
is called visibility principle, according to which -rules have to make their
principal formulas visible, standing alone on their side of the turnstile6. Solving
such an equation consists in giving the sequent calculus rules that govern the
use of complex statements with ⊗ as principal connective on the left and on
the right of `. The aim is that the rules which solve the equation correspond to
the two directions, upwards and downwards, of the equation. The downward
sense of the double rule will always be conserved as a rule of Formation. Thus,
in our case, we will have:
A,B ` Γ (⊗-Formation)
A⊗ B ` Γ
But in the other direction, it is impossible to keep
A⊗ B ` Γ (⊗-Implicit Reflection)
A,B ` Γ
because it is not an introduction rule, and therefore not a sequent calculus rule.
It describes what is deducible from A⊗ B. But it constrains only implicitly the
meaning of ⊗: it is a proper “Reflection rule” which indicates the way back to
the structural metalanguage, but at the cost of presupposing a knowledge of
the meaning of A⊗B. We have to make explicit what remains implicit here, i.e.
to find an introduction rule which is provably equivalent to the implicit rule.
How do we find such a ⊗-explicit reflection (⊗-) rule? We can start from
a ⊗-identity axiom: A⊗ B ` A⊗ B. Then, we apply  to it:
A⊗ B ` A⊗ B (⊗-)
A,B ` A⊗ B
in order to have the ⊗-compound assertion appear on the other side of the
sequent. The obtaining of a ⊗-reflection axiom (A,B ` A⊗ B) is the first step
towards an  right introduction rule equivalent to the  elimination rule.
6The visibility principle also accounts for the splitting of cut just mentioned: in a sequent
calculus enjoying visibility, full cut is not an admissible rule. See Sambin et alii [2000].
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The  rule just generalizes the reflection axiom: the idea is to put also the
antecedent formulas A and B on the right side to get a full right rule. This is
accomplished by two simple cuts:
Γ ` A A,B ` A⊗ B
Γ, B ` A⊗ B Γ ′ ` B
Γ, Γ ′ ` A⊗ B
We are now in position to show that the two rules ⊗- and ⊗-:
A⊗ B ` Γ (⊗-)
A,B ` Γ
Γ ` A Γ ′ ` B (⊗-)
Γ, Γ ′ ` A⊗ B
are (equivalent. We have just proved one direction. Now, suppose ⊗- a prim-
itive rule of a system S. The following proof guarantees that⊗- is admissible:
A ` A B ` B (⊗-)
A,B ` A⊗ B A⊗ B ` ∆
A,B ` ∆
As one may notice, according to the definitional equations picture, con-
junction (as well as disjunction) will split into multiplicative and additive con-
nectives. Actually, the following definitional equation stands for the additive
conjunction:
Γ ` A Γ ` B (&)
Γ ` A&B
The distinction between additive and multiplicative conjunction depends on
the difference between a link “and” inside the scope of a link “yields” (multi-
plicative) or outside (additive). Of course, disjunction is subject to the same
phenomenon.
Definitional equations can be formulated (see Sambin et alii [2000] for de-
tails) for the 0-ary connectives ⊥, >, 1, 0, but difficulties arise when it comes
to implication. Remember that Basic Logic definitional equations and rules
are visible: contexts aside principal and active formulas must be empty. The
definitional equation for implication has the following form:
A ` B (→)` A→ B
But this equation is not solvable: it is impossible to apply→- to the identity
axiom A → B ` A → B because →- only applies to sequents with empty
antecedents. This raises the interesting issue of the good framework in which
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one is supposed to formulate definitional equations (keeping in mind that equa-
tions are always solved using only elementary means available in the structural
calculus —see Definition 2 below)7.
What is distinctive of the  setting? First, the interplay between L and L,
which implies that each logical constant mirrors a structural link, and which is
guaranteed by the reflection principle. Then, the fact that what is performed
on one side of the turnstile must also always be performed on the other side. A
symmetry principle is implied in the definition of the class of the definitional
equations (if an equation is solvable on the left, the corresponding equation
on the right is also solvable). And finally, the emptiness of the contexts aside
principal formulas in  rules, coming from the visibility principle.
We can now state a precise description of the property P we are after. Bel-
nap’s criterion, conservativity, is fine, except that it is language relative and
cannot be directly expressed as a property of definitional equations per se. We
need to pinpoint some property of definitional equations that is responsible
for the holding of conservativity in normal cases, and that blonk will not en-
joy though it can be conservative over an already pathological language. Now,
as long as one does not go into higher-order languages, it is well-known that
conservativity results from the subformula property, which stems itself from
cut-elimination. The problem of finding P reduces then to the problem of find-
ing a “local” property, i.e. a property of definitional equations per se yielding cut
elimination. To be fully precise, given the following definition,
 1 () A set of introduction rules for a logical constant is
correct if and only if when they are added to a basic logical sequent calculus, the new
system still enjoys cut elimination.
P should guarantee that introduction rules derived from a P definitional equa-
tion are correct.
Fortunately, the proof of cut elimination is modular enough; to check that
cut elimination is preserved through basic logical system, it is enough to check
that essential cuts, i.e. cuts on formulas which have just been introduced, can
be eliminated.8 Therefore, P just has to guarantee that this can be done. Now,
7One can extend Basic Logic by adding structural rules or by liberalizing contexts. Liberal-
izing contexts yields Linear Logic, which would give the following solvable definitional equation
for→:
Γ,A ` B,∆ (→)
Γ ` A→ B,∆
One would then have to show that formulating definitional equations with less constraints is
harmless.
8Here, we simplify matters a bit. In particular, one has also to check that commutative steps,
which allows one to raise the cut until introduction rules are met, can be performed. See Sambin
et alii for details about cut elimination in  and the family of calculus that can be obtained from
 [2000]. In , visibility, which prevents contexts from occurring aside a principal formula
simplifies greatly the usual proof. The proof of cut elimination can be extended from  to
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the logical insight is that properly solving a definitional equation corresponds
precisely to performing an essential reduction step. P can thus be phrased as
the property of being solvable in the following sense:
 2 ( ) An equation is solvable iff there exists an
 rule such that
1. there is an elementary proof of  from .
2. there is an elementary proof of  from .
where an elementary proof is a proofwhich uses only elementarymeans (axioms, exchange
rules, L and R)9.
The following theorem holds:
 1 If a definitional equation is solvable, then the corresponding formation
and explicit reflection rules correctly define a logical constant.
Proof: We shall consider an arbitrary constant  whose definitional equation
(E) has been properly solved. Without loss of generality, we assume that  is




A B ` ∆,∆ ′
where Seq1(A,B/∆,∆ ′) stands for one or two sequents whose premisses are
among A and B and whose conclusions are structures among ∆ and ∆ ′.




Seq1(A,B/∆,∆ ′)  F
A B ` ∆,∆ ′
Π2
...
Seq2(Γ, Γ ′/A,B)  
Γ, Γ ′ ` A B 
Γ, Γ ′ ` ∆,∆ ′
Seq2(Γ, Γ ′/A,B) representing the premise(s) of the explicit reflection rule.10
Now, by hypothesis, (E) is properly solvable. Therefore, there is an elemen-
tary proof schema (Sol) which derives  from .
logics with stronger structural rules.
9Here “elementary” is synonymous with “available in the structural calculus”: definitional
equations are solved within C.
10Actually, there might be more than one  rule and therefore more than one form of essen-
tial cut. In this case, there will be several proof schemas giving the  rules from the  rules to
deal with the different essential cuts.
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Two observations on (Sol) are in order. First, since it is elementary and
there is no introduction rule on the right for , every occurrence of a  on the
right can be traced back to an axiom.
Second, we can assume that (Sol) contain only cuts on formula of lower
complexity than A B. A cut like
Π1
...
Γ ` A B
Π2
...
A B ` ∆ 
Γ ` ∆
can be eliminated in the following way. We know that the occurrence of AB
on the right comes from an axiom AX, therefore, we can uniformly substitute
∆ to the occurrences ofAB coming from that axiom (we shall speak of linked
occurrences)11. The axiom AX has be turned into A  B ` ∆, which is given
by Π2. Therefore, (Sol) is of the following form (boldface font marks linked
occurrences):
A B ` A B  Seq1 ′(A,B/A B)
... Seq2(Γ, Γ ′/A,B) (Sol)
Γ, Γ ′ ` A B
where Seq1 ′(A,B/AB) is an instantiation of Seq1(A,B/∆,∆ ′) that is the (or
one of ) the sequent(s) Seq1(A,B/∆,∆ ′) with A B standing for ∆ (one of ∆
and ∆ ′).
Let’s go back to our the essential . Explicit reflection has been ob-
tained through solving (E). Thanks to (Sol), we can obtain the following proof
of the same sequent using implicit reflection instead of explicit reflection:
Π1
...
Seq1(A,B/∆,∆ ′)  F
A B ` ∆,∆ ′




Seq2(Γ, Γ ′/A,B) (Sol)
Γ, Γ ′ ` A B 
Γ, Γ ′ ` ∆,∆ ′
Then we can glue the leftmost part of the proof on top of the axiom in order to
obtain a proof of the final sequent without the last cut: we use the same trick
as before and just substitute ∆,∆ ′ for A B in the consequence of the axiom
and in linked occurrences downward:
11This kind of substitution on proof-trunks preserves the property of being a proof-trunk, as
shown by the Substitution Lemma 4.1 in Sambin et alii [2000].




Seq1(A,B/∆,∆ ′)  F




Seq2(Γ, Γ ′/A,B) (Sol)
Γ, Γ ′ ` ∆,∆ ′
What we have is not a real proof, because   is not a sequent calculus rule.
But the implicit reflection rule just follows a formation rule, so we can elimi-







Seq2(Γ, Γ ′/A,B) (Sol)
Γ, Γ ′ ` ∆,∆ ′
(Sol) contains only axioms and cuts on formulas of lower complexity thanAB.
Therefore, we have completed the desired reduction step. 
The proof of Theorem 1 supports
 2 Solvable definitional equations do characterize genuine logical constants.
because solvability yields the reduction step for essential cuts, the reduction
step yields correctness, and correctness yields conservativity. Thus, solvabil-
ity is clearly established as a sufficient condition for definitional equations to
characterize a genuine logical constant. One could also ask if solvability is a
necessary condition. This question can be raised in two different ways. First,
granting that introduction rule should come from double rules, i.e. granting
Claim 1, one could ask if our notion of solvability can be relaxed so that intro-
duction rules could be more easily derived from double rules. Here, we shall
note that without the equivalence of  and , introduction rules cannot be
said to be rules for the very constant characterized by the double rule. Now
one could suggest to ease the elementarity requirement. But, as will be shown
by the analysis of blonk, this is not compatible with the holding of Theorem 1.
Second, one could challenge Claim 1 at the same time, and ask whether all intro-
duction rules for which there principal cuts can be eliminated can be analyzed
through a double rule. This amounts to asking for the converse of Theorem 1.
It can indeed be proven using both a uniform substitution trick mimicking the
one we used and a combinatorial analysis of the form of introduction rules.
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3    
Theorem 1 and Claim 2 provide us with a better understanding of what is wrong
with blonk and tonk. Let’s try to solve the blonk definitional equation. One
can try either to give a strong or a weak  rule. A strong  rule will yield the
 rule, but it would make the system inconsistent, so Theorem 1 tells us that
there is no elementary proof from  to this  rule. This strong  would be
something like the axiom
(blonk )
A blonk B ` C
It can be derived from ,
A blonk C ` A blonk C ()` C Weak
A blonk B ` C
but this proof is not elementary, since weakening is used. On the contrary, a
weak  rule would not result in an inconsistent system. In that case, it will
not be possible to get  from . For example, one could try to think of blonk
as some kind of additive conjunction:
A ` ∆ 
A blonk B ` ∆
There is an elementary proof from  to this  rule. But, again, this is not a
solution because there is no way back from it to the  rule.
Claim 2 bans pathological definitional equations. But Theorem 1 tells us
also something about pathological introductions rules, like the ones for tonk,
namely that there is no definitional equation of which they are a solution.
Claim 2 bans therefore pathological introduction rules as well.
As a conclusion, though there is no double rule for tonk, tonk strikes back
in a double rule setting, because pathological double rules like the blonk rule
do exist. But a definitional equation defines a genuine constant only if it can
be solved. Fortunately, pathological rules cannot be solved. Thus the dark side
of logical inference does not prevail.
One might ask further if our Claim 2 makes a point in favor of basic logic or
linear logic as the one true logic. Would the special role of weakening we have
just underlined constitute an argument against say, classical or intuitionistic
logic? The idea would be to argue that logical constants are essentially “basic”
objects on the ground that the structural parts of classical or intuitionistic
logic is not an accurate setting for resolving definitional equations. But we do
think there is a non sequitur here. The fact that weakening should not count
as an elementary means is not an argument against weakening per se, it just
shows that it is not part of what logicality is about, namely reflecting links in
a structural calculus. Following Sambin [2000], the picture we have in mind is
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a pluralistic one in which basic logic as a common ancestor of a wide range of
logics, which can be obtained from it by adding structural rules. Definitional
equations show in which sense a logical constant remains the same in different
structural contexts.
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